Introduction
Let it be stated at the outset that the historian of Canadian or Australian science almost inevitably, without heroic effort, must strike a defensive pose. Because the history of science has, as a professional discipline, so long wedded itself to great men and to great ideas, any study of science in the dominions on such terms will come up short. At least before the 1950s, important research-as measured by traditional international standardswas, for both countries, the exception, not the rule. True, the award of a Nobel Prize to Banting and Macleod in 1923 was a bracing tonic for the youthful Canadian scientific community, yet it was a feat not repeated for a half-century. Is it possible, without some sense of inferiority, to construct a traditional history of science noting that William Bragg, ingenious researcher at Adelaide, had to return to England to enter the lists of physics? And to whom did he appeal from his isolated outpost but Ernest Rutherford, who had himself proceeded from McGill University to the scientific metropolis, having escaped two peripheral scientific nations, Canada and New Zealand?
Fortunately, the history of science is freeing itself, if slowly, from the thrall of a narrow vision of science that places a premium upon so-called pure science, centred upon universities. If we fix our sights upon a list of scientific 'firsts,' like latter-day Poggendorfs or Darmstadters, then we would be hard pressed to explain how both colonies emerged as sophisticated and wealthy nations. Scientific activity, of course, is a much broader, richer enterprise. We now perceive the contours of Canadian and Australian science in sufficient detail to recognise that their respective development during the last century differed in significant ways from that of European nations, though both exhibited features of American science.
There is no question that Canadian, American and Australian science were each once colonial, in the sense that their scientific priorities were dictated from beyond their own boundaries. When had Canada or Australia moved beyond this stage? There can be no doubt that this occurred for Canada in the half-century between Confederation and the first World War, and it happened on all 27 fronts, industrial, educational, institutional, organizational and governmental. For Australia, the transition seems to have occurred later, but was well under way before the war.
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For the period under consideration, we cannot deny that the hallmark of scientific activity in both dominions was practicality, though 'practicality' was a protean conception, changing in time and space. 2 The overwhelming preoccupation with the application of scientific knowledge for economic and social development did not necessarily entail a lack of interest in knowledge for its own sake. But when we measure scientific activity, we find the latter to be a small fraction of the former, even if the ratio changed over time.
Two kinds of frameworks to which we can affix our facts immediately present themselves: the developmental and the structural. The first is epitomised by Basalla's 'colonial science' model and the more sophisticated version of MacLeod. This analysis sees the development of science as a passage through phases from complete dependency to eventual self-reliance. This view easily accommodates itself to a centre-periphery analysis. A structural approach focuses upon the actors, institutions and relationships with other parts of society. In their study of Australian science, Inkster and Todd 4 posit three structural elements: basal, infrastructural and superstructural. The first refers to factors supporting or constraining science such as population, urbanization, occupa-tions, communications, nature of staple exploitation, in short, uniquely local conditions. The infrastructure of science refers to those institutional supports required for the growth of a scientific community, whilst the superstructure refers to the individuals and institutions who 'do' science in our conventional historical sense. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive; any reasonable account of national science would give us a 'moving picture' of the matrices of individual and institutional actors of growing complexity and shifting linkages. An important question from the developmental perspective is whether one can discern discreet points at which the picture shifts in significant ways ('phases'). If such points do exist, are they indicative of some fundamental shift in structural elements? From the structural point of view, can we be certain to have isolated the relevant factors and to have demonstrated their connexions? Clearly, we have some distance to go before offering more than generalised schemata.
In this article, I have a more limited ambition. I would like to explore a means to compare scientific activity in Canada and Australia before World War I. For the moment, I shall leave unexamined the question whether such a comparison is valuable (it is the raison d'être of this volume) and concentrate upon what one might compare and how. Looking to Inkster and Todd's structural elements, we may note that historians of science have a broad knowledge of the infrastructural and superstructural elements for both countries. We can juxtapose these histories and the similarities are striking and interesting if we refrain from making invidious comparisons with contemporary British or Continental science. Much less explored are the linkages between the basal elements and the other two, where the role of the state is central.
Methodology
As I have argued elsewhere, 5 we can analyse the expenditure patterns of governments over time to obtain an aerial view of the relationship between the state and scientific activity. The modern measurement of R & D expenditures is inappropriate for nineteenth-century Canada and Australia and the statistical data that we possess for the period sheds no light on scientific expenditures, as these were not matters of interest to government statisticians. As a rough-and- One important SRE is almost impossible to reconstruct: the specific allocation to science in the education system. Accounts of public instruction in no jurisdiction convey more than the general expenditure on education. Even if we possessed local school board accounts, it is unlikely one could identify specific science-related costs. In a few cases, the public accounts do mention grants to school districts for apparatus or laboratories. University grants are also difficult (or impossible) to assess. Only for technical education (manual training, agricultural education, etc.) do we have access to the numbers, as it was normally considered distinct from public instruction in this period. for example, Ontario was more directly interventionist than contemporary governments in New South Wales, although Painter's claim that for the latter, 'state involvement was applauded as a sign of the application of "science" to national development, and the "cult of the expert" was a strong influence on the administrative style and political attitudes alike' could easily be applied to Ontario, but for an earlier period. 11 The asymmetry of the two federal systems (and their timing) also complicates the comparison. Nevertheless, the SREs are sufficiently similar for us to try. In agriculture, Britain was far more hesitant to invest in agriculture than the US or Canadian and Australian colonies. By 1860, the SRE patterns in the mother country were considerably different from those of its offspring.
One further proviso: a direct comparison between Canadian and
Turning to our first comparison, at the beginning of our period, surveying looms larger in New South Wales (much of southern Ontario had been surveyed by Confederation), whilst agriculture was the most significant investment in Ontario. Table 2 shows the Ontario expenditure pattern, which may be compared with New South Wales in Table 3 . The amounts, in local dollars and pounds, are not directly comparable; we are more interested in percentages and heads of expenses.
The SREs account for a similar level of expenditure in both jurisdictions: 7% in Ontario, 5% in New South Wales. 
Science in the Federal Government
In July 1915, the Imperial government created the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to coordinate scientific work for the war effort. Whitehall hoped that its colonial counterparts would follow suit quickly. The Commonwealth obliged by establishing the Council on Scientific and Industrial Research. 15 The Canadian government, distracted by other matters, did not bestir itself until nearly a year later. On 6 July 1916, cabinet issued an Order- When the Canadian federal government came into operation in 1867, it gave little thought to possible future scientific operations. Much of the expenditure that had any link to science-such as funding for higher education, agricultural organizations, mechanics' institutes or scientific societies like the Natural History Society of Montreal-passed to the provinces. Naturally, the Geological Survey of Canada remained within the federal fold; as neither the provinces of Nova Scotia nor New Brunswick had created official geological surveys, the GSC, which already maintained links with local Maritime geologists, could easily expand its operations into Eastern Canada and, soon, into the vast, newly-acquired western territories. Yet, apart from the Survey's budget and small grants to observatories, the federal expenditure on science was vanishingly small. The development of the country's natural and human resources would require substantial increases in investment in scientific activities, first in surveying, then in agriculture and other economic sectors such as fisheries, mining, animal and human health. The period from 1867 until well into the 1890s was marked by episodes of economic depression, slow population growth, feeble immigration coupled with significant emigration to the United States. The country did not immediately realise the promise of the west. However, the industrialization of Canada, already well underway in the 1870s, made significant strides in the next two decades.
In the late 1890s, just after the Liberal party came to power under Wilfrid Laurier, the tide turned for Canada. The economic sun began to shine, immigration grew apace and the Wheat Boom began. The growth of federal scientific agencies reflected all these factors. Table 6 Table 7 , provides a sense of the relative importance of different areas of expenditure. Such comparison is highly problematical: German figures can be divided into appropriations by the Reich government and those of the constituted Lander of the empire, which in larger Lander (Prussia, Bavaria, Wurttemberg) loomed large. The United Kingdom was not, of course, a federal state at all, whilst the American figures, being only for the federal government, ignore the individual state expenditures which, given the great deal of overlap and duplication of state institutions (equally true of Canada), were not insignificant. Still, we do obtain us a rough sense of national scientific priorities at the turn of the century.
In the table, the German figures combine the Reich and Lander expenditures. The Reich spent the most on its exclusive areas (military, patents), leaving most other categories to the latter. Canada and the United States appear to be quite similar with three significant differences: Canada spent nothing on museums (nothing like the Smithsonian Institution existed), nothing on higher education (a strictly provincial area) and nothing on military science and technology. The last category is easily explained given that Canada was not an imperial power and maintained a very small military establishment. Germany and Britain have certain similarities, especially institutional and organisational support, but Britain was clearly behind in its investment in agriculture and development and in health. If we now take into account the population differences, we can work out a per capita expense for SREs: United States ($ .13), Britain ($ .10), Germany ($ .21) and Canada ($ .43). Even if the Canadian figures are inflated-due to the lack of financial reporting detail in the public accounts-its expenditure is clearly much larger than the more economically developed countries. That Britain brought up the rear is no surprise: as late as 1939, J.D. Bernai complained that Britain still lagged seriously behind other developed nations, especially the United States. 20 The percentage values give a better indication of the relative Just as one may argue a basis of comparison between Ontario and New South Wales, one might find parallels between less populous jurisdictions: British Columbia and South Australia. Settlement occurred earlier in South Australia (from the late 1830s) and agriculture was a far more significant economic activity before the turn of the century. Population growth reached a plateau in South Australia during the depression of the 1890s. The population of British Columbia doubled every decade from the 1880s. After the turn of the century, population in both concentrated in the major cities. (See Table 8) The SREs in both were small until after the turn of the century, when the interest in state support of development became an important factor in both jurisdictions. In Table 9 , we see the SREs for British Columbia for 1914-15.
In British Columbia, this amounted to 5% of provincial expenditure. The South Australian expenditures for 1914-15 are tabulated in Table 10 . The outlay represented 5.5% of the total state appropriations for that year.
Both jurisdictions (see Chart 6) devoted over half their SREs to development. Agriculture (including the support of education, associations, stockbreeding, fruitgrowing, exports and irrigation) and forestry consumed the most funds in both instances, though for geographical reasons, the emphasis is reversed.
27
26 From an agricultural perspective, both were relative 'wastelands' with mountains in British Columbia and vast arid areas in South Australia. 
